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New York City has long operated under the perceived low risk of severe hurricanes 
impacting the major city. In late October of 2012, Superstorm Sandy struck with 
ferocious intensity and exposed many weaknesses on multiple levels, from city to the 
federal government. As far back as 2007, New York City has been publishing 
groundbreaking and forward thinking long-term sustainability reports to deal with the 
threat of climate change on the city, and the impact it will have on various stakeholders. 
This thesis will examine the key points of three of the major reports, and identify to what 
extent areas in which vulnerable community stakeholders were involved. PlaNYC, A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York, and the Hazard Mitigation Plan all have attempted 
to plan for the long term across numerous hazards and risks that the city faces. The 
destruction that Sandy caused in the Brooklyn neighborhood of Red Hook epitomized the 
failures on multiple levels of city’s response. At the same time, it became a case study for 
community led disaster response in the face of great neglect for some of New York’s 













This thesis was inspired by the devastating impacts that New York City faced 
during late October in 2012 when Superstorm Sandy made landfall. While the impacts 
were felt differently from neighborhood to neighborhood, New Yorkers came together as 
one to rebuild and recover. As a lifelong New Yorker, I witnessed the devastation and 
horrors during September 11th. Just four years later, I travelled to New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina decimated the Gulf Coast, and assisted in the rebuilding efforts in the 
ninth ward. Whether circumstantially or purposefully, I have witnessed the lowest and the 
highest that cities can go through.  
 
I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Lance Freeman, and my reader 
and professor, Peter Marcotullio, for guidance and encouragement with this complex and 
at times, overwhelming topic.  
 
To the residents of Red Hook, Brooklyn, you have reminded me what it means to 
be a true New Yorker, with your selfless actions in a time of crisis. I will forever be 
inspired by what I learned in Red Hook and at Columbia to make this city a more 
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Superstorm Sandy began forming on October 22, 2012, and was forecast over a 
week before it made landfall on the east coast of the United States. It was originally 
predicted that the storm would turn east and head out into the Atlantic Ocean, missing the 
major east coast cities. Forecasting models showed the storm making landfall in the New 
Jersey/ New York City metro area. The National Weather Service confirmed this 
trajectory on October 24th, and the region began to brace for the impact. Sandy had a 
wind field of over 1,000 miles, and a highest recorded wind speed of 115 miles per hour.  
 
Sandy made land fall on October 29th, 2012. High tide coupled with the left hook 
of the storm caused over 10 feet of storm surge to inundate coastal neighborhoods. 
Record Setting 30 foot waves were measured off the coast of the Rockaway Peninsula. 
The eastern coast of Staten Island and Red Hook in Brooklyn were two of the hardest hit 
areas, with flooding destroying many businesses and damaging many homes and 




                                                                   Map Source: A Stronger, More Resilient New York 
 
By the time Sandy was over, it had impacted 24 states, all the way to Wisconsin 
and Michigan. Total damage was $65 billion, with $19 billion from New York City 
alone. Sandy caused 48 deaths in the New York City alone, many due to drowning. Off 
the coast of the Rockaways, waves as big as 32 feet were recorded. Homes and structures 
were left flooded and destroyed, with over 100 homes destroyed by fire in Breezy Point.  
 
There has been much discussion in the past decade about global warming, and the 
effect it has on weather events. There is no doubt that the planet is getting warmer as 
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CO2 emissions continue to rise, as they have since the industrial revolution. Oceans are 
eight inches higher than they were in 1900, a huge increase. The book Global Weirdness 
nicely summarizes sea level rise over the past century, “There’s also some evidence that 
the rise has been faster lately: the average rate of sea-level rise from 1961 to 2009 was 
about 0.07 inches per year. But if you look just at the years 1993-2009, the rate was 
nearly double that, or about 0.12 inches per year. The increase could be due to a stronger 
influence of global warming, since warming melts ice and make seawater expand. 
Changes in ocean currents can also make sea level locally higher or lower than the global 
average”1. Reminiscent of the destruction caused in the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005, Sandy proved to be a storm that the New York City was not prepared for.  
 
New York City is at a particular high level of vulnerability because of the “New 
York Bight”. This term refers to the right angle formed by the geography of Long Island 
and New Jersey, and the magnitude of force that is heightened and funneled directly into 
the five boroughs. Storm surge and damage is amplified, especially in the neighborhoods 
that lie on the coast. This makes New York one of the most vulnerable cities in the 
United States for severe weather events. Not only is the land vulnerable, the already at 
risk and vulnerable populations are put at elevated levels of damage and destruction. Add 
the densely populated areas that are situated in these vulnerable areas, and a bleak picture 
begins to get emerge for millions of New Yorkers. While all 520 miles of coastline in 
                                                
1 Climate Central, Global Weirdness (Vintage Books, 2012) 84. 
2 City of New York, A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Mayor Bloomberg’s 
Administration, 2013, p. 25) 
 
3 Coastal Storm Plan, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/planning_response/planning_coastal_storm_plan.sht
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New York City are not at high risks of flooding and damage, there is a very real threat to 
many residents on the water.  
 
Vulnerability is a topic that appears in most of the planning literature, and must be 
addressed to give context to this thesis. As an area of study, three main points usually 
define vulnerability: exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. Exposure defines the 
ways in which an area or populations is physically exposed and vulnerable to hazards. 
Sensitivity describes those who are most at risk of these hazards (ie: the elderly or poor). 
The adaptive capacity, which is the underlying theme of this paper, refers to the ability of 





The exposure is dependent on external factors while the sensitivity and adaptive capacity 
depend on actors internal to a community.  
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It is also important to note that the events that occurred in Red Hook with 
NYCHA were not entirely a NYCHA problem. No city agency, no matter how well 
funded could have been completely prepared for every foreseeable risk and hazard. But 
irrespective of the funding issues, when a city agency is the only life line for so many 
vulnerable residents, it must be held to a higher standard. No matter the amount of 
funding, there was clear lack of planning and recovery efforts on multiple levels, made 
worse by the existing factors in Red Hook.  
 
Disasters often occur at random, and can be very hard to predict. Cities like New 
York are no stranger to devastating disasters. The terror attacks of the World Trade 
Center in 1993 and on September 11, 2001 proved to be a test of security and recovery 
before and after the devastation occurred. New Orleans was decimated during Hurricane 
Katrina, and endured much more severe flooding than New York City did. Through 
addressing social and environmental injustices, the city was able to recover and rebuild 
over time. It is in the same manner that New York City can now help shape the 





Coastal cities around the world are faced with numerous climate related issues, 
much more so than in the past decades. Climate change has forced cities to plan for rising 
sea levels, flooding, and overall severe weather events occurring at much higher 
frequencies than ever before. In New York City, agencies have had to plan long term for 
adaptation strategies, hazard mitigation, and increased resiliency on all levels. With 
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400,000 residents currently living in the 100-year floodplain, populations that had long 
been considered safe and protected are at high risks of many climate related disasters.  
 
There were dozens of reports released in the following year to address adaptation 
and mitigation efforts. There have also been numerous reports authored by local non-
profits and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, several academics and 
professionals have penned scholarly journal articles, even though Sandy occurred barely 
two years ago.  
 
The research and data on this topic is fairly recent and ongoing. Plans set forth by 
the city have projections that date to 2050, and 2100 in some cases. While many of the 
future projections have not yet occurred, cities have been forced to plan for the threat of 
severe weather events occurring more frequently. 
 
 One common theme present in most of the literature is the idea of resiliency. The 
2013 PlaNYC SIRR report “A Stronger, More Resilient New York” was a comprehensive 
look at the ways in which New York City must change and restructure its infrastructure 
to withstand future storms. The report is the latest edition of the PlaNYC reports that 
were first published in 2007. The Vision 2020 uses almost the exact same metrics to 
determine climate models and forecasts, but as it relates to the coastline specifically. 
Vission2020 was published and released in early 2011, but outlined identical vulnerable 
areas as the SIRR did. GIS maps and community based research is very similar. This is 
the case with most NYC based plans, as the city does a very lengthy and engaged 
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community outreach and consultation program for each report and initiative. As is the 
case with Designing for Flood Risks, and Urban Waterfront Strategies, the narrative of all 
the reports is one of urgency, practical strategies that can have immediate to long lasting 
impacts on the vulnerable populations.  
 
 The non-profit and NGO reports were more community based with the narrative. 
The reports varied from municipality level initiative and plans, to responses to already 
published city plans. Many of the reports also touched on housing, and the threat of 
climate change and increased storms on already disadvantaged populations of NYC. The 
research was very much more bottom up and began with local residents and local entities. 
Red Hook Initiative release their report one year after Sandy struck, and outlined the 
community led response that followed in the immediate aftermath. Local volunteers and 
groups were much more quickly able to provide the needed services and aid to those who 
were affected. Outlines the benefits of local groups to have their own disaster response 
plan. Red Hook was one of the hardest hit areas of the city, and floodwaters reached 
almost every block. Red Hook Houses is one of the largest and most populated housing 
developments in the entire city, and acted as a microcosm example of the city’s slow 
response to the poor.  
 
On a similar community level response, the Sandy Regional Assembly compiled 
dual reports, one examining the SIRR report, and one outlining the recovery agenda. The 
Assembly is comprised of over 30 members from varying community and business 
groups, and spearheaded by the NYC Environmental Justice Alliance. When large, 
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comprehensive city wide reports are published, it is often the case that there is no follow 
up with communities or residents. The Assembly took this opportunity to ensure that 
there was a complete review of the SIRR report as it pertained to residents of the 
neighborhood is discusses. This exemplifies the community led response and review of 
the city functions and long term planning.  
 
 The research and data that has been collected and presented through these various 
sources are all based in scientific grounding and findings by international climatologists 
and scientists. The data clearly states that global warming is a real, anthropogenic 
phenomenon that has drastic effects on the world’s ecosystems. In urban areas, these 
effects can be amplified for the millions of residents who reside along coastline and in 
floodplains. In the NRDC’s report, Preparing for Climate Change: Lessons for Coastal 
Cities from Hurricane Sandy, discussed the research that was currently available for the 
threat of rising sea levels to coastal cities. While it touched on New York City, and stayed 
more general to include a variety of cities along coastlines, many of the hazards presented 
mirror the hazards outlined in PlaNYC reports and community based reporting.  
 
The Netherlands presents an interesting case study and perspective for water 
management approaches and flood resiliency. Sebastiaan van Herk, Chris Zevenbergen, 
Richard Ashley, and Jeroen Rijke released an article titled, “Learning and Action 
Alliances for the integration of flood risk management into urban planning: a new 
framework from empirical evidence from The Netherlands” in the Environmental Science 
and Policy Journal in 2011. The framework outlined can be applied to most communities 
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at risk of flooding and rising sea levels. Van Herk outlines a new framework on how to 
organize a “Learning and Action Alliance” to support collaborative planning. 
Collaborative planning provides opportunities for a wide range of stakeholders, both 
public and private to be actively involved with developing long term plans. 
 
 In a purely transparent process, this interactive decision making should result in a 
richer policy proposal that can be implemented and adapted more efficiently, and 
ultimately raise the democratic legitimacy of the final decisions. “The multi-objective 
decision making use din urban planning is complex and needs decision makers who are 
capable of planning urban areas that can accommodate uncertain futures” (544).  
Additionally, it is noted that there is not one single stakeholder that has final or absolute 
control over the development or long term plans. The key in this framework is the social 
aspect. Continuous social learning is key to ensure that the public is knowledgeable on 
current issues that affect their communities and vulnerability. Many neighborhood and 
communities that are adversely affected by climate change do not have the proper 
education on the subject matter to make informed decisions. However, if a group of 
individuals or organizations with a shared interest in innovation and the scaling-up of 
innovation, is a topic of mutual interest, the social fabric can be developed to integrate a 
socially based response and collaboration effort.  
 
In the Global and Planetary Changes Journal in 2002, Vivien Gornitz, Stephen Couch and 
Ellen Hartig released an article titled, “Impacts of sea level rise in New York City 
metropolitan area”, looking at direct effects of sea level rise on the region. Within the 
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next 20 years, sea level rise is expected to increase by up to 30 cm (11.8 inches). By 
2050, SLR could be up to 60 cm (23.66 inches) and up to 108 cm (3.5 feet) by the 2080s.  
 
 
The American Planning Association in partnership with FEMA released Report 576 
titled, “Planning for Post- Disaster Recovery: Next Generation”. Edited by James 
Schwab, the report outlines best practices for preparing for the next generation of 




Focusing on the cycle that disaster planning should follow, Schwab emphasizes the 
relationship between these components. Mitigation and preparedness, often seen as the 
same action, are indeed very different when disasters are the topic. Mitigation deals with 
the physical condition of the risk or hazard, attempting to lessen the potential severity. 
Preparedness can be seen a more temporary and provisional, focusing on more short-term 
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measures in the absence of mitigation actions. Schwab states “what you cant mitigate for, 
you prepare for”. Recovery and response can occur in a formal or informal setting and 
manner, depending on the forces at work in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. In 
more formal settings, the response is top-down, as well as the recovery process. In more 
informal settings, in the absence of city led recovery efforts, as was the case in Red 
Hook, the response and recovery can be bottom-up and involve community based 
individuals more.  
 
 
The Sandy Regional Assembly is an association of a variety of environmental 
groups, community based organizations and labor unions that came together after Sandy 
to come up with best practices and plans moving forward. In the April 2013 report titled 
“Strategies for community based resiliency in New York and New Jersey”, SRA firmly 
believes that the low-income communities and most vulnerable groups are an integral 
part of the recovery and planning process. More often than not, long-term plans are top 
down and begin at the top of local government. New York City, in the outer boroughs, 
are predominately minority residents, with few resources and means to prepare and 
respond before and after a disaster strikes. The SRA argues that the low-income 
communities are n the frontline of climate change impacts, but can be the best resource 
for the city to use to understand the real impacts of sea level rise and increased storms on 
the coastal neighborhoods. Given the impacts that these neighborhoods face, the SRA 




Goal 1: Integrate Regional Rebuilding Efforts with Local Resiliency Priorities 
Goal 2: Strengthen Vulnerable Communities and Address Public Health Impacts  
Goal 3: Expand Community Based Climate Change Planning, Preparedness and 
Response  
 
Goal 1 encompasses areas in which public housing resiliency can be strengthened, given 
the effects seen in Red Hook. The first goal is to strengthen resiliency in NYCHA and NJ 
public housing. This would involve an overhaul and upgrade of the power grid by 
installing energy back up systems and solar panels to ensure that power can still be 
supplied if power is lost, as it was during Sandy. NYCHA would also need to move all 
generators and electrical equipment to higher floors and HVAC systems be moved to the 
roof if possible. Many residents on upper floors were left stranded due to the elevators 
shutting down. Some of the residents were handicapped and confined to wheelchairs. 
Ensuring that NYCHA properties have a secondary power source able to power the 
elevator would leave no residents stranded and without medical care. Additionally, 
NYCHA could create an updated registry and log of elderly and disabled residents. 
NYCHA did create such a log, but only in haste while Sandy was approaching. A more 
permanent log could be created and updated to ensure that NYCHA knows exactly what 
residents need to be given priority when a storm is approaching.  
 
The third goal is one that will ultimately strengthen community base efforts. 
While these points are general and broad, they can be applied in many communities and 
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can act as a solid base for the beginning of bottom up planning. The local capacity to plan 
and respond to future emergencies must be strengthened to ensure that the most 
vulnerable are prepared to respond in the absence of a response from the city.  
 
In late August in 2005, Hurricane Katrina, similar to Sandy, was a wake up call to 
New Orleans. While the actual storm did not cause much destruction, it was the failure of 
the levees and the subsequent flooding that caused the horrible damage and loss of life. 
Most of the city was safely evacuated before Katrina struck, but a large population 
remained. This was either because those residents did not have the ability to leave, or 
wanted to take the chance and ride the storm out. Many of the residents who decided to 
stay were placed in the Superdome, which acted as a makeshift shelter.  
 
The severity of Katrina as a category 4 storm was much more severe than 
Superstorm Sandy. The City of New Orleans has historically been more racially divided 
than New York City, but similar to New York, the most affected areas were 
neighborhoods predominantly minority, as was the case in Red Hook. The resulting 
community led planning has been studied, and presents the benefits of using on the 
ground community groups to lead the recovery efforts.  
 
The urban planning program at MIT spent the following years after Katrina 
working with community based groups on developing plans for 17 targeted recovery 
areas. Anna Livia Brand and Karl Seidman led the school’s planning efforts, and released 
“Assessing Post- Katrina Recovery in New Orleans”, in the following years after Katrina 
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hit. As stated previously, New Orleans has been a racially divided city historically. The 
long term plans and rebuilding was mostly focused on the upper class neighborhoods and 
area with more financial means to rebuild- even though those neighborhoods were less 
affected. MIT found that the community led response has been inequitable and have 
further reinforced the historic racial and economic disparities. “This lack of attention and 
investment continues to exhibit a racially charged recovery process and the city has done 
little to use rebuilding to address historical disparities in terms of race and class”.  
 
MIT found that while community led planning has been the norm for the recovery 
process, “critical shortfalls in the recovery effort to date have perpetuated an inequitable 
and inefficient rebuilding process.” Funds that should have been better spent in poorer 
neighborhoods went to wealthier, less needed areas. Similar to New York City, the 
neighborhood organizations that are involved with the rebuilding process are limited by 
capacity and resources. “With little economic and administrative capacity, most of these 
markets organized by neighborhood organizations operate only once a month and are 
struggling to supply fresh produce and food to the community.” While food is just one 
area that was critical in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the long term lack of 
planning for the most vulnerable communities has exemplified the disparities in the 
aftermath of the devastating storm. The recommendations that MIT proposed were: make 
equitable recovery a city and state priority, empower planning and enhance capacity to 
implement plans, strengthen communications, invest building strong civic and public 
institutions to support neighborhood rebuilding, and keep New Orleans on the national 
agenda. It is important to note that New Orleans was a much harder hit city, with much 
 19 
poorer and socially disadvantaged residents affected. The planning and recovery process 
after Katrina hit attempted to involve every income level, a wide variety of 
geographically separated areas and uncoordinated community based organizations, the 
recovery process is less direct and specific than New York City after Sandy.  
 
 Similar to the MIT study, Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government 
released a report titled, “Lessons from Katrina: How a community can spearhead 
successful disaster recovery”. This study focused on the neighborhood and community of 
Broadmoor, a hard hit area during Katrina. The bottom-up neighborhood approach is key 
in ensuring that the residents of Broadmoor are integral in long term planning efforts. 
This report defines this as a decentralized neighborhood approach, and begins with the 
individuals within the affected neighborhood or community to lead and spearhead the 
community groups. This approach is a departure from the standard top-down method, 
which is led by city, state or federal task forces and is more centralized in management. 
This is the common approach mainly because recovery funds come from the top and are 
distributed to lower level groups and organizations. Broadmoor recognizes that the most 
informed and the best individuals to lead the recovery efforts are those who were directly 
affected and have a personal connection to the residents.  
 
 While not the case in Red Hook, repopulation in New Orleans was a key issue 
following the storm. Whether through complete destruction of homes to large numbers of 
residents choosing to abandon the properties, many of the hardest hit communities were 
left almost entirely vacant. Without the funding allocated to these neighborhoods, little 
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incentive was left to return. Harvard and those working with this study project used 
outdated yet effective means of communications to reach residents not “on the grid”, but 
who still needed to be reached. By using flyers, lawn signs and banners, these 
organizations were much better able to reach the residents and relay messages.  
 
 Columbia University professor Clara Irazabal & Jason Neville also examined the 
bottom-up approaches in New Orleans, and released the findings in the article, 
“Neighborhoods in the Lead: Grassroots Planning for Social Transformation in Post- 
Katrina New Orleans” This examination looked at the shortfalls in the cohesiveness in 
the multiple stakeholders attempting to work together. Pre-Katrina, Irazabal states that 
the city of New Orleans and the planning for disasters, “lacked any cohesive, long term 
governing coalition, instead relying on short-lived, issue based coalitions that prevented 
stakeholders from either reaching shared understandings of policy problems and 
solutions, or recognizing and forming a larger, more systemic community agenda”. This 
echoes the post-Sandy community based efforts in New York City, with little overlap 
between citywide efforts and those at a local level.  
 
Active citizenship is key in disaster planning, and particularly for the poor 
residents to hold the government and city accountable to their civil and political rights. 
This is often described as “insurgent planning or citizenship”. After Katrina struck, 
community based groups, already vastly separated by issue and constituency, formed 
what Irazabal calls “de facto empowering of communities”. Similarly developed out of 
sheer necessity and willpower following Sandy, New York City saw community-based 
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groups with little previous allegiance to each other prior to the storm, sharing resources 
and communications to ensure that the gap between the city and local response was as 
small as possible. Post Katrina, Broadmoor suggested radical tool for preventing future 
flooding- return part of the neighborhood to nature, while keeping the central residential 
pockets built. While this cannot be the case in Red Hook, it exemplifies the sometimes 
needed radical ideas to be started by those who know the neighborhood best. Irazabal 
also states that while this type of grassroots planning is more feasible and common in the 
developing world, areas with high amounts of poverty and low education in the 
developed world can share common practices out of a lack of response by the 
government.  
 
The area of hurricane and disaster planning is a fairly new and recent area to 
examine. While there have been books and reporting published over the last 20-30 years, 
only the most recent surveying and data post Sandy is most valuable in compiling an 
accurate picture of current hazards. As is the case with most disasters, community level 
action is high, and in areas like Red Hook, we can paint a near complete picture of local 
response efforts. While very dense and technical reports released by the city and city 
agencies gets more into the data and forecasting of future events, it misses the mark to 
engage with on the ground community members. This effort and point of focus is more 
important and valuable in assessing the resiliency of a neighborhood or community 
group. It can’t be ignored that these groups are often times more effective in providing 
immediate aid and care to those affected.  By examining an responding to the data and 
plans that a top down long term report offers, it is imperative that all communities, not 
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just those affected by storms, examine and respond for the benefit of those who live in 




In 2012, Superstorm Sandy wreaked havoc on New York City. Flooding reached 
farther inland than ever previously recorded. FEMA flood maps that were being used to 
predict flood risk were last published in 1983. These maps are referred to as FIRMS 
(Flood Insurance Rate Maps), which are used by the National Flood Insurance Program 
to mandate certain flood insurance requirements, which New York City relies on FEMA 
to produce. Zones are designated by level of vulnerability, including land areas that are at 
risk of severe and destructive wave action, and that might require flood-protective 
construction standards.  
 
Based on the 1983 maps, only 33 square miles of all of New York City were 
within the 100-year floodplain (the area that has 1 percent or greater chance of flooding 




Map Source: A Stronger, More Resilient New York 
 
In these flood zones, as of 2010, 218,000 New Yorkers resided in vulnerable areas. 
Additionally, 14 of the city’s wastewater treatment plants, and 12 of 27 power plants 
(equivalent to 37 percent of the city’s generational capacity) are in the 100-year 
floodplain. 35,500 buildings, 377 million square feet of flood area, and 214,000 jobs also 
reside in the 1983 FIRMs. In 2007, 5 years before Sandy, New York City called on 
FEMA to update the FIRMs, as well as to convert the maps into digital form, which had 
not been available in such a format. The 2007 updated maps were virtually identical to 
the 1983 maps, with just minor revisions. As the most updated and accurate maps for 
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flooding, it is imperative that the FIRMs be regularly updated to accurately reflect 
changing coastal vulnerabilities.  
 
 Sandy struck New York City with unprecedented force and fury. High tides, a full 
moon, and a century of rising sea levels (sea levels have risen 1 foot since 1900) made 
way for a perfect storm of events. The resulting flooding was more than one and a half 
times larger in area coverage than what the 1983 FIRMS had predicted the 100-year 
floodplain would be. In Queens and Brooklyn, the area of land flooded, roughly 33 
square miles, was equivalent to the entire 100-year floodplain for all of New York City 
predicted by the 1983 maps. Additionally, over 60% of the effected buildings, and 50% 
of the residential buildings in the flooded area were outside the 100-year floodplain. 25 
percent of the buildings that the Department of Buildings deemed to be heavily damaged 
or destroyed by Sandy were also outside the floodplain. In the 2013 NYC report titled “A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York” reported that “In these areas, not only were 
residents unaware of the risks that they faced, but the buildings in which they lived and 
worked had not been subject to the flood-protective construction standards that generally 
apply within the floodplain” 
 
There was clearly a need to update these maps. Three months after Sandy, FEMA 
issued interim maps, known as Advisory Base Flood Elevation maps, or ABFEs. Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg simultaneously issued zoning restrictions and temporary 
modification of building codes that allowed residents to begin rebuilding to standards that 
reflected actual flood risks. The ABFEs were similarly issued for Louisiana and 
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Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina due to the fact that those maps were also outdated. In 
June of 2013, FEMA released the next series of maps; the Preliminary Work Maps, 
PWMs. To date, these are the most accurate set of map and modeling that New York City 
uses. The final set of FIRMs is likely to be released in late 2015. The new FIRMs and the 
current PWMs are expected to very similar.  
 
The Preliminary Work Maps paint a very new picture of flooding vulnerability for 
New York City. The overall area now covered has increased by 15 square miles, roughly 








Map Source: A Stronger, More Resilient New York 
 
There are now 67,700 buildings in the floodplain, which cover 534 million square feet of 
floor area. This is an increase of 90% for the number of buildings, and an increase of 
42% for floor coverage. Additionally, there has been a 61% increase in the number of 
residential units now in the floodplain, reaching 196,700 units. In total, nearly 400,000 
residents in the five boroughs now live in the floodplain, a dramatic increase of 83%. 
These numbers still only account for 5% of the total population of New York City. In 
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New Orleans, for example, 240,000 residents live in the 100-year floodplain, but 







Share of Total 
Population 








New York 398,100 5% 48 8,300 
Houston 296,400 14% 107 2,800 
New Orleans 240,200 70% 183 1,300 
Miami 144,500 36% 18 8,000 
Fort Lauderdale 83,200 50% 21 4,000 
San Francisco 9,600 1% 3 3,200 
Data Source: A Stronger, More Resilient New York City 
 
Density is also an important factor; New York City has 8,300 residents per square mile in 
the 100-year flood plain. New Orleans by comparison, only has a density of 1,300 
residents per square mile in the floodplain. It is clear that New York has some of the 
highest levels of vulnerable residents than any other city in this country. And within the 
zones, density is very high, mainly due to the high occupancy developments that are 
found along the coast. On a local level, New York City greatly expanded the evacuation 
zones to coincide with the soon to be released new FEMA flood maps. When Sandy 
                                                
2 City of New York, A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Mayor Bloomberg’s 
Administration, 2013, p. 25) 
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struck, the evacuation zones were divided into just three zones, covering over two million 
residents. A total of six zones now exist, designated 1-6, with zone 1 being the most 
vulnerable to storm surge and flooding.  
 
In the days leading up to Sandy making landfall, Mayor Bloomberg initiated the 
Coastal Storm Plan through the Office of Emergency Management. The Mayor can 
initiate this plan for any type of storm related event, from a single snowstorm to a more 
severe category 5 hurricane. Prior to Sandy, the plan was activated during Hurricane 
Irene3. The plan is divided into multiple categories, each tasked with overseeing a 
separate citywide component. The categories are as follows: storm tracking and 
notification, decision-making, evacuation, sheltering, logistics, public information, 
recovery and restoration. Decision-making is tasked with officially calling for the 
mandatory evacuation, which applies to public housing as well. Evacuation pertains to 
who will be evacuated and what areas will be given priority status based on predicted 
weather patterns.  
 
Sea levels will continue to rise and will result in constantly changing flood zones. 
By 2050, New York City’s floodplain could reach 72 square miles, almost a quarter of 
the city’s total land area. With significant increases in the number of residents who now 
live in federally zoned vulnerable areas, flood insurance has become a very real obstacle 
for thousands of residents who had never had to consider the high cost of purchasing 
                                                









 It is difficult to define community led disaster planning due to the fluidity and 
ever changing nature of individual neighborhoods. Often times, the planning takes place 
after the disaster has occurred, leaving little time to adequately plan for a particular 
disaster. It is near impossible for any population, whether as a small community or a 
large city, to plan for every contingency and risk. No two storms are alike, and flooding 
can occur in varying intensities and locations given the tide and moon cycles. With each 
disaster come best practices for that particular area, which can be applied elsewhere.  
 
 At the very least, community planning should be a purely participatory process. 
Communities, neighborhoods and residents have the right to be an integral part of the 
decision making process. Without input from the residents and those who have a unique 
and personal connection with the vulnerable areas, the planning process is entirely top 
down.  
 
 There is also an issue of justice and democracy, planning issues that should 
always be addressed, especially when dealing with vulnerable populations and already at 
risk groups. It is imperative that these two issues be kept together and not separated. 
Justice deals with reducing inequalities and ensuring that social justice measures be 
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woven into the planning process. Democracy should safeguard the ability for those who 
would be most affected to have a voice in long term decisions that will ultimately shape 
the ways in which the neighborhoods will plan , respond and recover from disasters. Too 
often city functions, whether it is long term planning or development, miss the mark to 
engage citizens and local groups.  
 
 The following reports are three of the main long term planning publications 
released by New York City in an attempt to outline best practices and long term goals to 





 In 2007, 5 years before Superstorm Sandy, New York City released what was at 
the time, the most comprehensive and groundbreaking long-term sustainability report to 
ever be released by a city. Under the direction of Mayor Bloomberg, the plan outlined 
127 initiatives to be accomplished in the short term, and whose outlook was 2030 and 
beyond. The Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability headed the report, with 
collaboration with over 25 city agencies. The 127 original initiatives were dispersed in 
ten overreaching goals: 
 
1. Housing 
2. Open Space 
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3. Brownfields 
4. Water Quality 
5. Water Networks 
6. Congestion Pricing 
7. State of Good Repair 
8. Energy 
9. Air Quality 
10. Climate Change 
 
The climate change chapter outlined three main initiatives to undertake: 
 
1. Create an intergovernmental task force to protect our vital infrastructure 
2. Work with vulnerable neighborhoods to develop site-specific strategies 
3. Launch a citywide strategic planning process for climate change adaptation 
 
Initiative 2 stated that “we will create a community planning process to engage all 
stakeholders in community-specific climate adaptation strategies”. Additionally, it stated 
that “While all five boroughs have vulnerable coastline, each community’s risk and the 
optimal solution to minimize risk will vary… A successful community planning process 
provides the neighborhoods with the tools necessary to understand the challenges, engage 
in problem solving, and effectively communicate preferred solutions.” Red Hook, one of 
the most vulnerable neighborhoods in the city at the time, was only mentioned twice in 
the report, under the brownfields section. While the original PlaNYC was 
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groundbreaking, it failed to specify particular neighborhoods that were at the greatest risk 
to storms. Similarly, there was no further mention of community collaboration beyond 
what was briefly outlined in the second initiative.  
 
 Just four years later, PlaNYC released its updated report, and outlined what had 
since been accomplished. Some of the goals were slightly modified, but the main 
objectives remained virtually identical.  
 
1. Housing and Neighborhood 
2. Parks and Public Space 
3. Brownfields 
4. Waterways 
5. Water Supply 
6. Transportation  
7. Energy 
8. Air Quality 
9. Solid Waste 
10. Climate Change 
 
Goal: Reduce greenhouse gas emissions by more than 30% 
 
Goal: Increase the resilience of our communities, natural systems, and infrastructure to 
climate risks 
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Reduce and track greenhouse gas emissions 
1. Release an annual inventory of greenhouse gas emissions  
2. Assess opportunities to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions by  80% by 2050  
Assess vulnerabilities and risks from climate change 
3. Regularly assess climate change projections  
4. Partner with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to update  Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps  
5. Develop tools to measure the city’s current and future climate exposure  
Increase the resilience of the city’s built and natural environments 
6. Update regulations to increase the resilience of buildings  
7. Work with the insurance industry to develop strategies to encourage the  use of flood 
protections in buildings  
8. Protect New York City’s critical infrastructure  
9. Identify and evaluate citywide coastal protective measures  
Protect public health from the effects of climate change 
10. Mitigate the urban heat island effect 11 Enhance our understanding of the impacts of 
climate change on public health 
Increase the city’s preparedness for extreme climate events 
11. Integrate climate change projections into emergency management and preparedness 
Create resilient communities though public information and outreach 
12. Work with communities to increase their climate resilience 
 
The achievements that PlaNYC were able to accomplish were important and done in 
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record time. But many of what the city was able to achieve were purely aesthetic and did 
not get at the heart of vulnerable neighborhoods. Below are some of the achievements 
outlined in the 2011 Progress Report: 
 
. 19 rezonings approved focusing development in areas well-served by transit  
. 100,000 affordable housing units created or preserved  
. 319,054 trees planted and 113 schoolyards to playground sites opened by April 2010  
. Office of Environmental Remediation created, becoming nation’s first municipal 
brownfield  office  
. All 14 wastewater treatment plants now meet Clean Water Act’s 85% pollutant 
removal requirement harbor-wide  
. 200 miles of bicycle lanes installed and bike access law enacted  
. Times Square, Herald Square, and Madison Square transformed into pedestrian 
friendly plazas  
. Greener, Greater Buildings Plan enacted into law, requires energy efficiency upgrades 
in all large buildings  
. 86 energy efficiency projects completed as part of plan to reduce City government 
energy use 30% by 2017  
. 25% of the yellow taxi fleet converted to hybrid vehicles  
. Clean air school bus law enacted, requiring installation of interior air quality controls 
on entire fleet  
. 9% decrease in citywide carbon emissions due to cleaner power generation and less 
sulfur hexafluoride release  
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. Assessment of climate change impacts on critical infrastructure completed by Task 
Force  
 
While this progress report was released just one year prior to Superstorm Sandy striking, 
the city fell short in enacting long-term community planning strategies. These reports 
dealt mainly with citywide initiatives, and failed to identify the most vulnerable 
populations. There was no vulnerability assessment in either version of PlaNYC. The 
community engagement level in this plan was low and did not better equip venerable 
populations for the increasing threat of large-scale storms, particularly on coastal 
populations.  
  
A Stronger, More Resilient New York & OEM CERTs 
 
 It is no surprise that the most thorough plan released by the city has been post 
Superstorm Sandy. In June of 2013, Mayor Bloomberg released, A Stronger, More 
Resilient New York. Headed by the NYS Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency 
(SIRR), it has been the most comprehensive resiliency report directly focusing on climate 












Water and Wastewater 
Other Critical Networks 
 
This report then selected 5 key areas in the city that were impacted during Sandy. This 
designation of vulnerable neighborhoods was something that was absent in earlier 
PlaNYC reports. Of the five neighborhoods (Brooklyn- Queens Waterfront, East and 
South Shores of Staten Island, South Queens, Southern Brooklyn, Southern Manhattan), 
Red Hook is located in the Brooklyn- Queens Waterfront neighborhood. This has been 
the first time this area has been specifically outlined in a long-term environmental 
planning report. There are still only two community-centered initiatives in the entire 
report to address disaster preparedness.  
 
1. Identify and address gaps in community capacity 
2. Continue and expand OEM’s Community Emergency Response Teams 
 
Initiative 1 focused on economic recovery and getting businesses back in operation after 
impacts from storms. It stated a partnership and possible neighborhood study with the 
NYC Center for Economic Opportunity. This initiative was subject to available funding, 
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and the SIRR report failed to further specify which community, if any, would be the 
study area. An Internet search failed to find any study done through this goal, whether 
through OEM or CEO.  
 
The second Initiative outlined the need to expand OEM CERTs. Currently, there are 54 
teams of 1,500 volunteers across all of New York City. The goal states “before, during, 
and after disasters, including extreme weather events, members of these teams help to 
organize community disaster preparedness and participate in emergency response and 
recovery. Going forward, OEM will work with communities to create additional teams, 
ensuring that the volunteers that staff are as representative as possible of the communities 
that they serve.” The CERT program was developed in 2003 after the CERT program 
enacted by FEMA. While the local CERTs have no connection to its federal counterparts, 
functions and roles are almost identical. When not engaged with an immediate disaster, 
CERTs “educate their communities about disaster preparedness through OEM’s Ready 
New York program and by building Community Disaster Networks.”4 The commissioner 
of NYC’s OEM Joseph Bruno praised the work, “Whether they are staffing reception 
centers, delivering supplies to neighbors, or interpreting conversations between 
community members and first responders, CERT volunteers have shown they are ready 
to help at a moments notice, and the City is extremely grateful for their service.” While 
CERT have to play a vital role in disaster preparedness, it seem sin the case of 
Superstorm Sandy, there was a top-down failure to ensure that these teams were deployed 
in Red Hook.  
                                                





OEM, which is tasked with ensuring that the city is prepared to prepare and respond 
during times of great crisis and disaster, fails at ensuring that basic information is made 
available in multiple languages. The diagram below is a form that can be filled out and 
submitted to OEM requesting additional pamphlets and flyers concerning emergency 
preparedness. Boxes checked N/A are not available in the language to the left. Of the 14 
languages on the form, only four are available (Chinese, English, Russian and Spanish). 
In a city as ethnically diverse as New York, it is shocking that the agency tasked with 
 40 
safety and emergencies does not have the capacity to reach more than 4 spoken 
languages.  
 This report, while a response to the devastation caused by Superstorm Sandy, did 
not adequately address on the ground actions that must be taken when a disaster strikes. 
This is made clear by the clear lack of concern to engage OEM CERTs in to these 
neighborhoods. It is a huge mistake not to make every emergency planning guide and 
materials available to each language spoken and ethnic group. Sandy exposed the need 
for direction and support in real time once the disaster and flooding occurred. Whether 
that instruction should come from NYCHA or a more localized group, it is clear that none 
of that was present, and the response was immediately and constantly evolving given 
those who were in most need of assistance.  
 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
 
 The Hazard Mitigation Plan released in 2014 on the same level at the SIRR 
report, and was a collaboration between OEM, The Department of City Planning and the 
Mayor’s Office of Long Term Planning & Sustainability. The 550-page plan was released 
to coincide with the SIRR report, but dealt with hazard mitigation to reduce the risk to 
people and property. The overarching goals outlines in the HMP differed from PlaNYC 


















OEM operates under the structure that places mitigation at the top of a cycle that also 
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includes preparedness, response and recovery. Using mitigation as the driving force to 
generate the rest of the cycle, OEM has focused much of its efforts on collaboration 
between agencies and stakeholders. Of the top goals of the hazard planning, OEM 
highlights 5: Leads to selection of risk-reduction actions, Builds partnerships, Creates a 
more sustainable and disaster-resistant city, Establishes funding priorities, and Increases 
public awareness of hazards. The last point, increasing public awareness is the most 
crucial for communities. Lower educated communities, regardless if it is located in a 
hazard area, can have less education about the true threats of climate change on the 
neighborhood. Top down approaches on the educational side of the issue can increase 
knowledge about flooding and increasingly severe weather events.  
 
To accurately assess the hazard associated in each area, OEM used what the other reports 
had not- an extensive risk assessment. Under specific FEMA guidelines in the Local 
Mitigation Plan Review Guide, OEM was required to include risk assessments in the 
report. The following is a break down of the FEMA requirements OEM operated under:  
 
FEMA Requirement 44 CFR 201.6(c)(2)(i) 
[The risk assessment shall include a] description of the type, location and extent of all 
natural hazards that can affect the jurisdiction. The plan shall include information on 
previous occurrences of hazard events and on the probability of future hazard events. 
 
FEMA Requirement 44 CFR 201.6(c)(2)(ii) 
The risk assessment shall include a description of the jurisdiction’s vulnerability to the 
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hazard described in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section. This description shall include an 
overall summary of each hazard and its impact on the community. All plans approved 
after October 1, 2008 must also address NFIP insured structures that have been 
repetitively damaged by foods. The plan should describe vulnerability in terms of:  
 
FEMA Requirement 44 CFR 201.6(c)(2)(ii)(A) 
The types and numbers of existing and future buildings, infrastructure, and critical 
facilities located in the identified hazard areas.  
 
FEMA Requirement 44 CFR 201.6(c)(2)(ii)(B) 
An estimate of the potential dollar losses to vulnerable structures identified in.. this 
section and a description of the methodology used to prepare the estimate.  
 
FEMA Requirement 44 CFR 201.6(c)(2)(ii)(C) 
Providing a general description of land uses and development trends within the 
community so that mitigation option scan be considered in future land use decisions.  
 
Using the requirements listed above, OEM was able to identify high areas of specific 
hazards based on multiple criteria.  
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The Mitigation plan was tasked with less community based focuses, and more city 
wide plans to minimize risk to a wide variety of hazards. While extremely useful as a 
resource guide for the city as a single entity, the breakdown of hazards presented an 
opportunity to integrate community engagement and input. While the Office of 
Emergency Management is tasked with more technical responses and planning, it is also 
in the best position to measure and establish community led planning to coincide with the 
top down approach of OEM.  
 
RED HOOK, BROOKLYN 
 
The neighborhood of Red Hook in Brooklyn was one of the hardest hit areas in 
the city, with some of the worst flooding and impacts of public housing. It was also the 
clearest example of negligence by the city to respond to those who most needed 
assistance in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Red Hook, a peninsula, is located 





Date Source: http://maps.nyc.gov/census/ 
 
Demographics of Red Hook* and NYC (2010 US Census) 
 
 Red Hook, Brooklyn NYC 
Total Population 10,228 8,175,133 
Race/ ethnicity   
       % Black 36% 22% 
       % Hispanic or Latino origin 42% 28% 
       % White, not Hispanic 17% 33% 
Education   
       % High School degree 14% 25% 
       % Bachelor’s degree 10% 20% 
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Income   
       Median household income $40,026 $51,270 
       % Below poverty line 45% 19% 
*Brooklyn Census Tracts 53, 59 & 85 were used to delineate Red Hook  
 
 
Red Hook has been one of the areas in Brooklyn to experience rapid gentrification 
on the northern section of the neighborhood. Ikea and Fairway have opened stores on the 
waterfront, along with some of the most expensive condominiums in Brooklyn above 
Fairway. While these portions of the neighborhood have seen shifting demographics and 
rental prices, Red Hook is also home to the Red Hook Houses, the largest public housing 
development in Brooklyn. In total, over 6,000 residents call the Red Hook Houses home. 
This development was first built as part of a Federal Works Program under President 
Roosevelt in 1938 to offer affordable housing for the growing number of dockworkers 
who lived in the neighborhood. But when shipping and ports moved from the Brooklyn 
waterfront to the larger ports in New Jersey, Red Hook’s economy rapidly declined. 
 
The vulnerability of Red Hook is both geographic and social. Geographically, the 
Brooklyn- Queens Expressway dissects this portion of Southern Brooklyn. The landmass 
for Red Hook is only 1.3 square miles, and houses over 10,000 residents as of the 2010 
Census. There is a 45% poverty rate and higher rates of asthma and diabetes than the city 
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wide average5. When Superstorm Sandy struck, Red Hook lost electricity, heat and 
running water for 3 weeks in some areas. Without these basic services, residents could 
not cook food, keep perishable foods fresh, and had no access to clean water. Upon being 
ordered to evacuate, residents who decided to stay felt protected and safe, as previous 
storms had no major impact. There were others who might have wanted to leave, but 
could not due to the severe lack of public transportation in Red Hook. The closest subway 
station is the Smith-9th Street Station, a far distance for the elderly and those with 
luggage. Public transportation played a role in not being able to leave.  
 
When contrasted to other significant Brooklyn neighborhoods, Red Hook’s 
socioeconomic status appears bleak. The table below is in ascending order by poverty 
level for 6 Brooklyn neighborhoods: 
 










DUMBO 3,600 5% $167,700 46% $1 M+ 
Gowanus 17,800 18% $68,500 25% $854,100 
Newtown Creek 12,400 19% $52,000 16% $678,400 
Greenpoint/ 
Williamsburg 
35,800 20% $60,400 18% $705,800 
                                                




Red Hook 13,800 33% $47,700 15% $615,600 
Navy Yard 5,100 36% $37,900 27% $506,800 
NYC 8,175,000 19% $51,300 33% $514,900 
 
Red Hook has one of the highest poverty rates in Brooklyn along with one of the most 
densely populated public housing projects in New York City. Additionally, Red Hook has 
the lowest home ownership rates of these neighborhoods at 15%. While most of the 
residents are renters, a large portion in NYCHA housing, leaving those residents at the 
mercy of a large city agency. In the months after the storm, NYCHA residents in the Red 
Hook houses experienced some of the worst neglect, with few answers.  
 










To fully appreciate the gross negligence of the city and the Housing Authority 
immediately following Superstorm Sandy, the history and overall portfolio of NYCHA 
properties must be outlined.  
 
New York City is home to the largest public housing agency in North America. 
The New York City Housing Authority provides housing for over 600,000 New Yorkers. 
The average gross income for residents is only $23,150. There are 334 developments 
over the five boroughs with over 13,000 employees. Created in 1934, the first 
development was the First Houses on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. The last 
developments to be constructed were in the 1980s, with the highest concentration of 
housing in East Harlem and Brownsville, Brooklyn. The Red Hook Houses are the largest 
NYCHA development in Brooklyn, with over 2,000 apartments. Additionally, there is a 
large concentration of developments on the Lower East Side and Two Bridges area, 
which abuts the East River. During Sandy, flooding impacted 402 NYCHA buildings, 
which is nearly 20% of the NYCHA portfolio6.  
 
There are 200 developments in evacuation zones across the city. In zone 1, there 
are 26 developments with 45,000 residents at risk. Of the 400 plus buildings, with 
roughly 80,000 residents that were impacted by Sandy, nearly all lost power and elevator 
services, and over 380 lost heat and hot water. 15 developments are located in zone 2, 
                                                
6 Housing First, Affordable Housing Policy Brief for New York’s Next Mayor 
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most of which are located on the lower east side of Manhattan. In zone 1, there are major 
clusters on the lower east side, Red Hook, and Coney Island. There is a long history of 
placing housing for lower income families and individuals on the fringes of the city. The 
first phase of the Red Hook Houses were built for the dockworkers, which placed them 
very near the water. Similarly, the first housing in the Rockaways were built for those 
who worked at the nearby airport, warehouses and factories. Over time however, these 
residents and developments became isolated as the city dramatically changed.  
 
When Sandy struck, most of the residents in the Red Hook Houses were left 
without heat, hot water, and electricity. Sporadic reports filtered in of elderly and 
disabled residents trapped on the upper floors of the buildings. With temperatures 
plunging to freezing, these already poor and vulnerable residents  
                                                    
The New School organized a panel discussion in February of 2013 just 4 months 
after Sandy struck. On the panel was John Rhea, the chairman and head of NYCHA at the 
time. Rhea has since been replaced as Mayor De Blasio has been elected. NYCHA has an 
undeniable history of unfavorable policies and actions at the expense of the 
overwhelmingly low-income tenants who reside in the developments. With such a high 
number of residents who depend on NYCHA to provide basic services, it is not surprising 
that the agency has come under fire on many occasions. Rhea was the poster child and 
target for the majority of the outrage that erupted after the storm. His background was in 
financial advising to Wall Street firms, and many residents saw him as careless and 
unsympathetic to the low-income populations. In his time at NYCHA, the backlog of 
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apartment repair requests rose to a staggering 420,0007. Additionally, Rhea and the 
agency were heavily criticized for the reported $45 million in city funds meant for 
upgrading and installation of new security cameras, a desperately needed repair for many 
developments riddled with high levels of crime.  
 
The panel at the New School came just one day before he appeared in front of the 
New York City Council’s Public Housing Committee to discuss NYCHA’s response. 
Below is a brief excerpt from the panel when asked about what he believes NYCHA has 
learned from Sandy:  
 
“The vulnerability of the physical structures was greater than anyone 
anticipated. When evacuating people out of zone A, they though that they 
would have about 200 affected buildings. It turned out to be twice that, 
with over 400 buildings. The venerability of the critical systems (boilers, 
electric systems) was very high too. They were all located in basements 
that were flooded. While the buildings may have stood up to the actual 
storm, it was the storm surge, the surge of the water, is what really caused 
the most damage. As a whole, NYCHA is very vulnerable due to the 
location of many of the communities.” 
 
                                                
7 Smith, Greg B., New York Daily News. http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nycha-
john-rhea-resigns-rocky-four-year-tenure-article-1.1562097 
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Interestingly, Rhea did not address the outrage from the tenants initially, and blamed the 
storm for the problems that the residents faced, yet still admitted to the high vulnerability 
faced by NYCHA developments.  
 
There is no doubting that the region was caught off guard and underplayed the 
severity of the storm. Massive preparations during Hurricane Irene just a few years before 
Sandy proved to be unnecessary given the actual impact of Irene on New York City. 
Unfortunately, there was a sentiment across many in the public that did not feel the need 
to evacuate or prepare for the storm. On a citywide level, agencies scrambled to brace for 
the storm, but it was the effectiveness, and not purely the action that has been questioned. 
Rhea noted that while the actual buildings withstood the force and storm surge, the 
utilities located mainly in basements and lower levels caused the most damage. Utilities 
for the developments were placed in the basements and cellars of the complexes, as were 
there breakers and generators for Con-Edison electrical company. This led to all of lower 
Manhattan being left in complete darkness in the immediate aftermath of Sandy. NYCHA 
had a particularly difficult time regaining the electricity and power following the storm. 
In NYCHA buildings without utilities, it took the city a total of 16 days to restore power 
to all, and an additional 4 days to restore heat to all residents. Temporary boilers are first 
installed in Coney Island on November 9th, and many of them still remain as the main 
source of heat. In February of 2014, the New York Daily News reported that NYCHA 
was spending $3 million a month in taxpayer’s money to use the 24 temporary boilers 
located in 16 developments across the city. A NYCHA Vice President told the City 
Council that these boilers would remain until at least 2016, which could total over $120 
 54 
million. Many of these boilers also cannot operate in temperatures below 40 degrees, due 
to the fact that they were rented from warm states such as Texas and Tennessee. With 
these boilers as just one issue that has shined more negative light onto NYCHA, it is clear 
that there is much needed fiscal oversight, in addition to the social aspects needed in this 
agency. Rhea did not publically address these boilers and the cost before he resigned.  
 
On the panel, Rhea also noted the possibly skewed misconception about the 
treatment of tenants in times of crisis.  
 
“People resisted the evacuation requests from NYCHA. There was fear 
and well placed paranoia that they won’t be let back in once they leave. 
There is also a large disconnect between what people think NYCHA is 
able to do and what they are actually to do. For example, acting as a social 
service agency to be able to handle every request or concern that any 
tenant has. This idea of expectations vs. capabilities. And how do you 
sync those two things up in the middle of a crisis. What is and is not 
NYCHA’s role, and if something is not NYCHAs role, whose is it?8” 
 
At the crux of NYCHA and the response that most residents believed was flawed, is the 
idea that Rhea pointed out on expectations vs. capabilities. This is a very important 
element that has not been debated enough post Sandy. Given the sheer size of NYCHA, it 
is very difficult to separate what the public believes the agency should be doing, and what 
                                                
8 The New School, NYCHA & The Hurricane, February 12, 2013 
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response is actually capable of. In times of emergency and crisis, it is clear that residents, 
who already lack many resources, turn to NYCHA for a range of requests and issues. 
While NYCHA has over 13,000 employees, it is still difficult to accommodate each issue. 
Rhea stated that NYCHA is often times seen as a social service entity, with many 
residents under the assumption that the agency can aid in social problems. Rhea made it 
very clear that his agency is only there to act as a supplier and landlord to the public 
housing it provides. If this is the case, there seems to be much more needed 
communication between the various agencies that revolve around the huge population of 
NYCHA resident. There is a link missing between those on the ground working for 
NYCHA during emergencies, and social welfare, social services and other resources 
tenants need to utilize. It is up to the resident to know who to call in times of crisis, and 
NYCHA does not seem to take any responsibility or role in ensuring that the other needs 
beyond the immediate housing issue is addressed. This leaves tenants with very few 
options, and the agency ideally free of blame when it cannot fulfill these roles. In 
Housing First’s policy brief on affordable housing, one of the recommendations outlined 
was “Appoint a Deputy Mayor of Housing overseeing DHS, NYCHA, HPD, HDC & 
Housing Recovery Office (HRO) to ensure interagency cooperation in public housing, 
homelessness, housing recovery and development.” While this targets affordable housing 
as a whole, it speaks to the need for improved and updated coordination on multiple 
levels with multiple agencies, a best practice that does not exist currently.  
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On the same panel at the New School, there was a lifelong Red Hook resident and 
community organizer Wally Bazemore, who was very vocal about the feelings many 
tenants have towards the agency.  
 
“The storm caught us off guard. Irene turned out not to be that bad for 
residents, so many didn’t get on the buses when they were there to pick up 
and evacuate, and that we could ride the storm out. Nature has a way of 
humbling us.” 
 
Many residents in the flood zone in NYCHA developments did not see the urgency to 
evacuate, and judged too much of it on the impact of the last sizable storm, Hurricane 
Irene. This can also be attributed to the overall flaws in basic communication between the 
agency and residents. NYCHA claims to have gone door to door in the days leading up to 
the storm, alerting the residents of the threat Sandy posed. A visit to NYCHA.com will 
prove that the agency does a lackluster job in making storm and emergency preparation 
plans easily available and accessible to the public. One would have to go through 
multiple tabs, with no clear direction to get to the “preparing for emergency” information. 
A visitor to the site would have to go to the “residents corner” tab on the main page, then 
to the “NYCHA prepares” sub tab, and then scroll to “get prepared for storm 
emergencies” link, which is the second to last link on the page. Given the very clear 
threat to many developments, it would seem logical to place emergency preparedness and 
possible evacuation information in an easy to find location on the website. This flaw 
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reinforces the notion that there is a wide gap between the agency and the actual residents 
and the public, especially during times of crisis.  
 
Community Based Response & the Red Hook Initiative 
  
During the terrible time of crisis, the community-based response that emerged 
was a direct result of the city and NYCHA seemingly forgetting about the Red Hook 
Houses residents for days. A staggering 82% of Red Hook residents reside in the Red 
Hook Houses, NYCHA’s second largest in Brooklyn. Red Hook Initiative, a youth based 
community non-profit, stepped in and offered weeks worth of resources and temporary 
shelter for many of the residents who were displaced. Historically, Red Hook Initiative 
has no emergency or disaster response training. RHI, with only a full time staff of 11, 
maintains the mission statement “We believe that social change to overcome systemic 
inequities begins with empowered youth. In partnership with community adults, we 
nurture young people in Red Hook to be inspired, resilient, and healthy, and to envision 
themselves as co-creators of their lives, community and society”. Through a time of 
crisis, when many were feeling forgotten about, this community led group took on roles 
that many believe should have been through NYCHA. Speaking to the bottom up and 
community led approach, Wally Bazemore highlighted the urge to provide assistance to 
fellow neighbors and community members,  
 
“We didn’t have any direction. Leadership was leading from behind. 
Neighbors helping neighbors took the lead. We knew this was going to be 
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our Katrina, but we were not going to be treated like our cousins down 
there in New Orleans. Took the bull by the horns and started organizing. 
In the dark, we found some light to organize. We reached out to 
politicians, any volunteers who were able to come. We knew we couldn’t 
depend on anybody but ourselves. We didn’t feel any connections to 
anyone else.” 
 
Bazemore feels a strong sense of leadership and will to ensure that the horrors of Katrina 
and what happened in New Orleans are not repeated. Stern and motivated, Bazemore 
took part in helping his fellow residents when it was clear leadership from the top was not 
going to arrive in time. It is this very response that exemplifies the urgent need for more 
transparency and communications, not just with residents, but with other city agencies as 
well. It is only then can residents be certain of the actual response that can be expected 
from NYCHA, and can be integrated with the community led response that was so 
effective in Red Hook.  
 
Post Sandy, Mayor Bloomberg requested his administration to analyze and report 
the city’s response to the storm. The deputy mayor for operations Caswell Holloway and 
deputy mayor for health and human services Linda Gibbs spearheaded the report titled 
Hurricane Sandy After Action report. It was released in May of 2013, giving the city just 
6 months to assess the response. A New York Times article that same month stated “the 
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point was to identify ways the city could do better, not find fault9”. Mr. Halloway was 
quoted saying, “We were certainly not in a self-flagellation mode”. It is clear that the 
Mayor and the city firmly believed that the response on every level was strong and with 
very few, if any faults. The New York Housing Authority response is very difficult to 
find analyzed in most official reports. Whether that is because there was little to question 
on the response from NYCHA officials, or because the city as an entity wanted to 
separate itself from the embattled agency, has not been confirmed either way. Regardless, 
there is a clear disapproval from the side of the residents towards the NYCHA 
administration. Most of this rhetoric can be found in non-official reports and interviews 
with the tenants. No where can one find these accounts on any city website, and certainly 
not NYCHA’s website. As far as the city and NYCHA is concerned, the response was 
appropriate and any minor flaw can be attributed only to the unforeseen severity of 
Sandy.  
 
 The New York City Housing Authority is one of the most vital parts of this 
amazingly diverse and historic bustling city. As a lifeline for over 600,000 New Yorkers, 
NYCHA must be as prepared, if not more, than private developments. With residents that 
are already vulnerable due to economic status, much more is needs to be done to ensure 
all basic utilities are restored in a timely manner. Additionally, and more importantly, 
NYCHA as an agency cannot be seen as an uncompassionate and completely top down 
entity in the eyes of the tenants. Residents have a great sense of responsibility for 
                                                
9 Halbfinger, David, Adding Evacuation Zones in Response to Hurricane (The New York 
Times, May 3, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/nyregion/new-york-city-to-
double-number-of-storm-evacuation-zones.html  
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themselves and fellow neighbors, and will step to the challenge when faced with a 
disaster. But the well being of this population cannot be dependent on the response of the 
residents themselves. Superstorm Sandy was a storm that many misjudged the extent of 
the damage, and was not the fault of any one agency or administration. But lessons about 
communication and cooperation were learned, and must be applied in a far-reaching 
manner to ensure that all residents are protected.  
 
The Red Hook Initiative was able to serve the needs of the residents in the 
neighborhood through food services and delivery for three weeks following the storm. 
The initiative was able to feed 1,000 people twice a day, a much needed service when 
power and food storage was down. The doors stayed open 12-14 hours a day for 24 
consecutive days. Residents with no heat or electricity fed off the power generator at the 
Initiative. The on the ground operation in an area that had extensive flooding during the 
recovery process presented unique challenges for the staff and volunteers. Social media 
played a vital role as well, and the Initiative received 300 contributions per day for 3 
weeks. It was not until local officials and representatives from city agencies arrived that 
public health needs were first addressed. This included porter potties, generated powered 
floodlights for safety concerns, and trash and litter removal by the sanitation department 
finally resumed. Temporary shower facilities were also brought in due to the water still 
being shut off to the entire area.  
 
The success of the Initiative resulted in $1.3 million in funding and donations after 
Superstorm Sandy.  
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Red Hook Initiative played a vital role after the storm, and filled the gap created by the 
blatant lack of response by the city. There was a clear separation between the residents of 
the Red Hook houses and the community sources that surrounded them. There was also, 
and more importantly, a clear division between the residents and the New York City 
Housing Authority. Either division could have led to the lack of resources and emergency 
services immediately following the storm. The bottom up disaster response seen in Red 
Hook speaks volumes about what an already disadvantaged community can accomplish 







Superstorm Sandy exposed was a severe lack of preparedness and readiness to 
respond to large-scale natural disasters. Clearly there was a lack of oversight and 
leadership that resulted in many of the hardest hit areas. Red Hook faced the brunt of the 
storm and flooding, and required the most community led response in the city. Red Hook 
is disadvantaged both socially and economically, and is geographically situated in a high-
risk area. The social capital was high in Red Hook, and despite the great challenges, 
neighbors extended a hand to neighbors, and while the city ignored what was happening, 
a small non profit was able to make a huge impact.  
 
The lack of outreach in different languages that should be made available at all 
times was truly shocking during this research. OEM’s CERT teams are solely tasked with 
ensuring that communities are equipped and prepared for disasters and emergencies, not 
just during hurricanes. But as an extension of the local government and the Office of 
Emergency Management, coordination between these agencies and residents who needed 
immediate help was lost.  
 
 The report and plans examined in this thesis were all very much top-down, and 
began with overarching goals and themes applicable to the city as a whole. While these 
plans were groundbreaking and acted as major influences for other municipalities around 
the country, it takes real digging to find the tangible community development and input. 
The goals and objectives outlined in the SIRR report are all suitable goals, but the fact 
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that they only emerged after the storm raises questions as to the actual preparedness of 
the city prior to Sandy striking. The plans did not adequately address the long lasting and 
extensive power outages and lack of basic and key services. Community groups need to 
be a much more integral participant in each long term planning proposal; communities 
and neighborhoods are best equipped to understand the residents and risks. A bottom up 
approach rather than a top down could lead to better-informed recommendations as to the 
adaptation and mitigation strategies at a local level. The adaptive capacity of individuals, 
local groups and neighborhoods is largely determined by the processes at higher levels of 
city government. There have been clear shortfalls with community disaster planning: 
 
• Lack of interaction between the Red Hook Houses residents and the surrounding 
neighborhood pre- Sandy 
• Lack of public transportation for evacuation 
• High vulnerability of the power system  
• Lack of adequate communication with OEM CERTs 
• Lack of education about threats of climate change 
 
In order to reach more members of a vulnerable neighborhood like Red Hook, the city 
must undertake a more rigorous planning process to better educate residents about the 
real threats of climate change and intensifying storms. This will include programs that 
bring in environmental educators to educate residents of Red Hook Houses and others 
who might not be versed in climate change literature and plans. Similarly, the plans that 
are released need to at the very least be available to more than 4 spoken languages. The 
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OEM emergency preparedness forms that are only available in limited languages is a 
perfect example of the lack of transparency and lack of priorities of these community 
outreach materials on a city level.  
 
 No city can fully protect all residents and all communities with any set of 
resiliency or environmental plans. New York City has been a leader in planning for long-
term climate change impacts and risks, and has been a model for cities around the world. 
But a better job can be done to engage community and individual stakeholders who are in 
the most vulnerable communities. In Red Hook, there was a clear breakdown in services 
and response from the city to ensure the already vulnerable residents were provided for. 
Community led disaster preparing and recovery has great benefits, and must be woven 
into the fabric of long-term solutions, if the city is to avoid another disaster in Red Hook 
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